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STUDENT NOTES
INJUNCTION AGAINST CONTINUED TRESPASSES
The recent case of Henline v. M'ller' raises the problem of
the right to an injunction against continuing trespasses.2 Because
of the great variety of principles applied by the courts, it is diffi-
cult to state definite rules governing this relief. The trend of the
decisions appears to be toward greater leniency in granting the
injunction, with a corresponding relaxation of the strict require-
ments once imposed. The modern tendency is to recognize that a
remedy which prevents a wrong is better than one which merely
attempts to give compensation for the injury after it has occurred.'
Consequently a landowner need no longer be content with dam-
ages after his rights have been invaded, but is entitled to an in-
junction against a threatened continuing trespass.4 Some states,
however, seem loathe to depart from the older view, and other
states, after apparently falling in line with the modern trend, have
reaffirmed their original position.
Historically the jurisdiction of equity to prevent trespasses to
land is an extension of its jurisdiction to prevent waste. In the
case of waste, since the remedy existed to protect the interests of
the reversioner or remainderman from injury by the tenant,
privity of estate had to be established. And because privity was
there required, courts also thought it necessary in early trespass
cases. But since there was no basis in reason for this requirement,
it soon became established that, in order to enjoin a trespass,
privity need not be shown.'
Often in suits to enjoin continuing trespasses, before the court
will pass on the merits, it must dispose of a preliminary question
in respect to the plaintiff's title. The fact that the plaintiff's title
is in dispute was originally thought to be a matter which went to
the jurisdiction of the court, but it would now seem to be well set-
tled that it goes rather to the exercise of that jurisdiction. If the
title is disputed equity generally will not enjoin such trespasses,
1185 S. E. 852 (W. Va. 1936).
2 For annotations on the general problem, see Notes (1924) 32 A. L. R. 463,
(1934) 92 A. L. R. 578.
sPOMEROY, EQurrY JURiSPrUDlN0E (4th ed. 1919) 3243.
4 West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Cheat Mountain Club, 212 Fed. 373,
129 C. C. A. 49 (1914); MeMorran Milling Co. v. Pere Marquette By. Co., 210
Mich. 381, 178 N. W. 274 (1920).
5 Lowndes v. Bettle, 33 L. J. Ch. 451, 3 New Reports 409 (1864) ; Moore v.
Halliday, 43 Ore. 243, 72 Pac. 801 (1903).
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but leaves the determination of title to the courts of law.
This rule, however, is subject to exception and limitation. As title
is in question in the majority of these suits, the court need not find
absolute title in the complainant.7 And if the threatened injury is
irreparable, a temporary restraining order will be granted. Like
relief may also be granted pending suit to try title, whether the
suit has been, or is about to be brought.9 Since absolute title is not
a prerequisite to a temporary restraining order, lawful and peace-
able possession, 0 or possession under prima facie title,:" or con-
structive possession, 2 is usually sufficient."3 Rapid strides have
been made by some of the more liberal courts in extending the
equitable remedy to include the determination of title.'4
Even though title to the property involved is not in dispute,
the principles which control the granting of injunctions against
continued trespasses are often vague. Originally the courts re-
fused to enjoin continuing trespasses on the ground that the legal
remedy was adequate, and a minority of courts still follow this
0 Woodstock Operating Corp. v. Quinn, 201 Ala. 681, 79 So. 253 (1918) ; Wat-
son v. Ferrell, 34 W. Va. 406, 12 S. E. 724 (1890); Schoonover v. Bright, 24
W. Va. 698 (1884); Lazzell v. Garlow, 44 W. Va. 466, 30 S. E. 171 (1898);
Freer v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 1, 43 S. E. 164 (1903).
7Baldwin v. Fisher, 110 Minn. 186, 124 N. W. 1094 (1910); Electro
Metallurgical Co. v. Montgomery, 70 W. Va. 754, 74 S. E. 994 (1911); Pardee
& Curtin Lumber Co. v. Odell, 71 W. Va. 206, 76 S. E. 343 (1912). See also
Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Felton, 103 Fed. 227, 43 C. C. A. 189 (1900),
that equity will interfere to prevent multiplicity, even though the complainant
has not established his right by a judgment at law.
s Camp v. Conner, 205 Ala. 468, 88 So. 578 (1921) ; Deane v. Turner, 113 Va.
236, 74 S. E. 165 (1912).
9 West Virginia Development Co. v. Preston County Development Co., 76 W.
Va. 492, 85 S. B. 688 (1915); Barth v. Shepherd, 80 W. Va. 218, 92 S. E.
317 (1917); Gamble v. Kennedy, 80 W. Va. 694, 93 S. E. 807 (1917); Me-
Donald v. Boggs, 97 W. Va. 201, 124 S. E. 680 (1924) ; United Fuel Gas Co.
v. Hays Oil & Gas Co., 107 W. Va. 255, 148 S. E. 76 (1929).
lo Heaton v. Wireman, 74 Neb. 817, 105 N. W. 634 (1905).
11 Pittsburgh, S. & W. R. Co. v. Fiske, 123 Fed. 760, 60 C. C. A. 621 (1903);
Kellogg v. King, 114 Cal. 378, 46 Pac. 166 (1896). But see Cunbee v. Ritter,
123 Va. 448, 96 S. E. 747 (1918).
:2 Dunker v. Field & Tule Club, 6 Cal. App. 524, 92 Pac. 502 (1907); Ho-
bart-Lee Tie Co. v. Stone, 135 Mo. App. 438, 117 S. W. 601 (1909).
13In Stroup v. Chaleraft, 52 1ll. App. 608 (1893), and Cragg v. Levinson,
238 Ill. 69, 87 N. E. 121 (1908), 21 L. R. A. (N.S.) 417 (1909) it was held
that where complainant's title is admitted by demurrer, an injunction will be
granted in order to avoid multiplicity. But see CLEPHANE, EQITY PLEA LNG
(1926) 227, to the effect that a demurrer does not admit facts stated in the bill
except for the purpose of deciding the demurrer.
140 'Brien v. Murphy, 189 Mass. 353, 75 N. E. 700 (1905); Cullen v.
Ksiaszkiewicz, 154 Mich. 627, 118 N. W. 496 (1908). See also Nelson Theatre
Co. v. Nelson, 216 Mass. 30, 102 N. E. 926 (1913); MeMlorran Milling Co. v.
Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 210 Mich. 381, 178 N. W. 274 (1920).
2
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view.'" But others soon held that an injunction would issue unless
the legal remedy was actually full and adequate, 0 or unless the
legal remedy was as practical and efficient as that of equity.17 A
few courts in reaching this result were aided by existing statutes. 18
The inadequacy of the legal remedy for a continuing trespass
is of course the proper basis for equity jurisdiction. The courts
have found that the remedy at law is inadequate either (1) be-
cause, the machinery of the law courts is not adapted to deal with
a continuing trespass in one suit, thus necessitating a multiplicity
of actions at law, or (2) because the injury is of an irreparable
nature, or (3) because the defendant is insolvent.'9
However, it is now widely recognized that the first ground is
the correct one and that equity acts to prevent a multiplicity of
suits at law. 20 The injunction will be granted upon this ground
even though the legal remedy is fully adequate for each of the
acts of the continuing trespass.2 ' A like result is reached where
the continuing trespass consists of the acts of several persons. 22
And although other bases for granting the injunction are often
present, the doctrine of the prevention of a multiplicity of suits
is alone sufficient.
But some courts require that irreparable injury be threatened
before the injunction will be granted.2" However, several juris-
dictions have by their interpretation of irreparable injury, so
'5 Gates v. Johnson Lumber Co., 172 Mass. 495, 52 N. E. 736 (1899) ; Worth-
ington v. Moon, 53 N. J. Eq. 46, 30 Atl. 251 (1894); Lazzell v. Garlow, 44 W.
Va. 466, 30 S. E. 171 (1898). However, it will be noted that the greater
number of these minority decisions are older decisions. See Note (1924) 32 A.
L. R. 482.
16 Moore v. Ferrell, 1 Ga. 7 (1846).
17fDeskins v. Rogers, 72 Okla. 274, 180 Pac. 691 (1919); Stotts v. Dichdel,
70 Ore. 86, 139 Pac. 932 (1914).
'8 Wiggins & Johnson v. Williams, 36 Fla. 637, 18 So. 859 (1895); Cobb v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 172 N. C. 58, 89 S. E. 807 (1916).
19 McCLiNTocx, EQuiTY (1936) §§ 41, 45, 134.
20 Cityco Realty Co. v. Slaysman, 160 Md. 357, 153 Atl. 278 (1930) ; Kins-
land v. Kinsland, 188 N. C. 810, 125 S. E. 625 (1924). Contra: Thorn v.
Sweeney, 12 Nev. 51 (1877); Roebling Son's Co. v. First National Bank, 30
Fed. 744 (1887) holding that the acts of trespass must be by several persons
in order to enjoin on the ground of prevention of multiplicity.
21 Ellis v. Blue Mt. Forest Assoc., 69 N. H. 385, 41 Atl. 856 (1898), 42 L.
L. R. 470 (1899); Colliton v. Oxborough, 86 Minn. 361, 90 N. W. 793 (1902).
See also Whittaker v. Stangvick, 100 Minn. 386, 111 N. W. 295, 10 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 921 (1907).
22Sequim Bay Canning Co. v. Bugge, 49 Wash. 127, 94 Pao. 922 (1908);
Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick, 151 Cal. 254, 90 Pae. 532 (1907), 12 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 275 (1908).
23 Randall v. Freed, 154 Cal. 299, 97 Pac. 669 (1908); Moore v. Halliday,
43 Ore. 243, 72 Pac. 801 (1903).
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widened the scope of the rule as to make it very nearly conform
to the doctrine of multiplicity applied by the majority.", The rule
that an injunction will not be granted unless" there is a substantial
injury, or conversely, that no injunction will be granted for a slight
injury is also of minority application.25 This rule approaches that
of irreparable injury, but requires less serious damage.
Again some courts require in the case of a continuing trespass
that the complainant show the insolvency of the defendant.' 6 If
the defendant is insolvent, the legal remedy, though theoretically,
perfect, would be worthless. In some cases insolvency, though not
decisive, has been an important factor in the determination of the
complainant's right to an injunction.27 But insolvency alone should
be a sufficient basis for the injunction.28 However, since the in-
junction may be granted either to prevent a multiplicity of suits,
or because of irreparable injury, insolvency is generally held to be
immaterial. 9
Further, an injunction is an especially appropriate remedy
where it can be shown that the acts of continuing trespass will
ripen into an easement. In this case no actual damage need be
shown.30  In Indiana, where the complainant was provided by
statute with a means of interrupting the use without resort to
equity, the court at first refused an injunction,2' but later held
that regardless of the statutory remedy an injunction was proper.2 -
24 Lloyd v. Catlin Coal Co., 210 Ill. 460, 71 N. E. 335 (1904); Boston &
Me. Ry. v. Hunt, 210 Mass. 128, 96 N. E. 140 (1911).
25 United States Freehold Land & E. Co. v. Gallegos, 89 Fed. 769, 32 C. C. A.
470 (1898); Chesapeake Co. v. Mt. Vernon Co., 107 Md. 528, 68 Atl. 1046
(1908).
20 Alexander v. Hill, 224 Ala. 671, 141 So. 638 (1932); Cumbee v. Ritter,
123 Va. 448, 96 S. E. 747 (1918).
27 Raleigh & W. R. Co. v. Glendon & G. Min. & Mfg. Co., 112 N. C. 661, 17
S. E. 77 (1893) ; Miller v. Wills, 95 Va. 337, 28 S. E. 337 (1897). The court in
this case also placed emphasis on the fact that the defendant was a non-resi-
dent, but query if this should make any differencel
28 Slater v. Gunn, 170 Mass. 509, 49 N. E. 1017 (1897) 41 L. R. A. 268
(1898); Wilson v. Hill, 46 N. J. Eq. 367, 19 AtI. 1097 (1890). The majority
of decisions seems to be contra to the view that insolvency alone is a suffi-
cient ground for granting the injunction. Supporting the minority see Ker-
lin v. West, 4 N. J. Eq. 449 (1844) that irreparable injury from continuing
trespass may arise either from the nature of the injury itself or from the
want of responsibility in the person committing it.
20 Lembeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336, 24 N. E. 686 (1890) ; Boston & M. Ry.
Co. v. Sullivan, 177 Mass. 230, 58 N. E. 689 (1900) ; Pardee v. Camden Lum-
ber Co., 70 W. Va. 68, 73 S. E. 82 (1911), 43 L. R. A. (n.s.) 262 (1913).
30 Szatbmary v. Boston & Albany Ry., 214 Mass. 42, 100 N. E. 1107 (1913);
Way v. Fellows, 91 Vt. 326, 100 Atl. 682 (1917).
3' Hurt v. Hildebrandt, 30 Ind. App. 415, 66 N. E. 173 (1903).
32 Syracuse v. Weyrick, 37 Ind. App. 56, 76 N. E. 559 (1905).
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Courts may be influenced by other considerations in deter-
mining whether to issue the injunction. Where the continuing
trespass is of such a nature that it is impossible to ascertain the
extent of the injury that may result, the full damage not develop-
ing until some time later, an injunction will be granted. 3 Further,
relief will -be granted if the expense of the suits ai law is shown to
be higher than the damages that can be recovered." And if the
continuing trespass is a menace to public travel, it may be enjoined
for that reason.3
5
Where the reoccurrence of the acts of trespass is not reason-
ably to be expected, the legal damages are considered adequate,
and the injunction denied.3" There is no need for an injunction in
any case of continuing trespass if the recovery of damages at law
would sufrice to prevent further trespasses.3 7 It has also been held
that it is not a matter of defense that the actJ of trespass were of
benefit to the complainant's property.8
G. G. B.
33Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Barnes, 101 S. W. 301 (Ky.
1907); Chesapeake Co. v. Mt. Vernon Co., 107 Md. 528, 68 Atl. 1046 (1908).
34 Evans v. Victor, 204 Fed. 361, 122 C. 0. A. 531 (1913) ; Abel v. Flesher,
296 Ill. 604, 130 N. E. 353 (1921); Bent v. Barnes, 72 W. Va. 161, 78 S. E.
374 (1913).
35 Atehinson, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Spaulding, 69 Kan. 431, 77 Pac. 106 (1904),66
L. R. A. 587 (1905); Mobile & 0. R. Co. v. Zimmern, 206 Ala. 37, 89 So. 475
(1921).
36 Fidler v. Roberts, 41 Fed. (2d) 305 (1930); Oregon-Wash. R. & N. Co. V.
Reed, 87 Ore. 414, 170 Pac. 300 (1918). Contra: Rhoades v. McNamara, 135
Mich. 644, 98 N. W. 392 (1904).
377 Frink v. Stewart, 94 N. C. 484 (1886).
38 Myers v. Kelly, 83 N. J. Eq. 474, 91 Atl. 598 (1914).
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